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The Friend of My Enemy is my Enemy. 
International Alliances and International Terrorism  
 
Abstract 
Terrorism is an instrument for groups that cannot achieve their political goals 
legally. One important strategic function of terrorism is to weaken the govern-
ment – either directly by attacking representatives or supporters of the govern-
ment or indirectly by causing a political response, which is unpopular among 
the population. Often, however, political stability of the home government is 
buttressed by foreign powers. In this case, the terrorists can have a strategic 
interest in attacking nationals of these foreign countries. This paper analyzes 
this logic by looking at international alliances as a proxy for international 
support. If the friend of my enemy is my enemy, then terror entrepreneurs, 
which seek to overthrow their home country’s government (the enemy), may 
find it attractive to target nationals of the foreign allies of their country (the 
friends of the enemy). Our theory predicts that attacking nationals of a foreign 
ally is particularly attractive if this ally is militarily more powerful than the 
home country. Moreover, the combined effect of alliance and relative power 
differentials becomes stronger the more democratic the ally and becomes weaker 
the more democratic the terrorists’ home country. We find empirical support for 
our hypotheses in an analysis of a directed country dyad sample of international 
terrorism. 
2 
1.  Introduction 
Why do terrorists from one country target nationals of another country? The 
fast growing literature on terrorism, which has focused on the root causes of 
terrorism (Abadie 2006), is surprisingly ill-equipped to answer this question. On 
a theoretical level, research has neglected the impact of links between the 
terrorists’ home country and the victims’ country on patterns of international 
terrorism. This has translated, on the empirical side, into studies that aggregate 
acts of terror at the country level (of the terrorists or the victims or the location 
of terror). These studies have generated insightful results. Yet, by design they 
are not capable of analyzing why terrorists from one country target nationals 
from some foreign countries, but not from others.1 
Starting from the assumption that terror groups want to gain a 
significant political influence on their country of origin or the broader region 
(Crenshaw 1981, 2001; Pape 2003, 2005; Kydd and Walter 2006), terror groups 
should mainly attack domestic targets. However, some governments borrow 
strength from more powerful allied foreign powers. Citizens from countries that 
stabilize the government in the terrorists’ home country may then become a 
derivative, strategic target of terror attacks. If the friend of my enemy is my 
enemy, then terrorist groups, which seek to overthrow their country’s 
government (the “enemy”), will find it attractive to target nationals of the 
foreign supporters of their country (the “friends of the enemy”).  
                                     
1  The only directed country dyad studies of terrorism we are aware of are Krueger 
and Laitin (2008) and Blomberg and Rosendorff (2006).  
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In this paper, we study one important way in which foreign support 
renders the nationals of the supporting country more vulnerable to becoming 
the victims of terrorism: international alliances. We argue that the incentive to 
inflict terror on nationals from the foreign ally becomes stronger if allies are 
militarily more capable than the home country. This interaction effect between 
alliance and relative difference in military capability is itself conditioned by the 
type of political regime in both of the allied countries. Specifically, the joint 
effect of alliance membership and power asymmetry becomes stronger the more 
democratic the foreign ally and the more autocratic the home country. 
We test the hypotheses derived from our theory on pooled data from a 
directed country dyad sample, covering the period between 1968 and 2003. As 
predicted by our theory, the global patterns of international terrorism vary with 
co-membership in international alliances, where groups from the weaker ally are 
more likely to attack citizens from the stronger ally than vice versa. We also 
find that this joint effect of alliances and power asymmetries is amplified by an 
autocratic government in the terrorists’ home country and a democratic 
government in the ally.  
2. The Strategic Logic of Attacking Foreign Allies 
This section develops a theory of the strategic logic of terrorism, international 
alliances, power asymmetries and democracy. We argue that attacking the ally 
of the home country’s government rather than the government itself can be an 
attractive and at times optimal strategy for terrorist groups. Our theory 
distinguishes three main actors: the terrorist group (called the terrorists), the 
government of the terrorists’ home country, which the group wants to fight and 
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ultimately overthrow (called the home government), and the government of the 
foreign ally of this home government (called the ally). 
2.1  The Strategic Logic of Terrorism 
Our theory starts from the premise that terrorist organizations strive for 
political power and control (Kydd and Walter 2006; Neumayer and Plümper 
2009a, 2009b), either in a single country or, as is the case with al-Qaeda and 
other transnational terror networks (Asal et al. 2007), in several countries of a 
particular region or civilization.2 Terrorism is an instrument for groups that 
cannot obtain this goal in a legal way – either because their country of interest 
is not a democracy or because they are too weak and unpopular to gain sub-
stantial votes, let alone get hold of government by winning elections (Enders 
and Sandler 2006).  
Terrorist groups differ in size, resources, the degree of violence they 
accept, and – perhaps most importantly – their ideology. Rapoport (2003) and 
Shughart (2006) distinguish three overlapping “waves of modern terrorism” in 
the 20th century: Anti-colonial and ethno-nationalist terrorism, particularly 
dominant in the 1950s and 1960s, aimed at political independence from the 
colonial occupiers or secession for their ethnic kin. Radical left terrorists 
triggered a wave that swept over many developed and developing countries in 
the 1970s and 1980s. More recently, international terrorism became dominated 
by Islamic terror groups seeking to replace moderate governments in countries 
                                     
2  This assumption may not hold true for every single terror group, but the vast 
majority of them have political objectives. 
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with a predominantly Islamic population by a more radical version of Islamic 
rule. Importantly, stark ideological differences notwithstanding all terror groups 
aim at gaining political power and control in a country. 
However, terrorism is poorly understood if one focuses exclusively on the 
long-term goals of the terrorist groups and ignores the strategic logic of 
terrorism. Since most terrorists are unable to reach their ultimate goals in the 
short-run, they need to focus first and foremost on two fundamental 
intermediate goals. On the one hand, they need to keep the group alive. On the 
other hand, the terror entrepreneurs need to gain power relative to the 
government they seek to overthrow. For terror entrepreneurs, a terror plot is 
beneficial if it increases the support of the terrorists amongst their peers and re-
duces the government’s strength. Attacks often provide terror entrepreneurs 
with media attention, and thus with the opportunity to promote their pro-
paganda and recruit new terror agents. 
At the same time, if the terror entrepreneurs intend to weaken the 
government, the attack either needs to affect the government directly (e.g., by 
killing an important representative) or it must cause a political response, which 
is unpopular among the population and thus weakens the government indirectly. 
As Kydd and Walter (2006) argue, provoking a harsh anti-terror response can 
be perfectly rational for terrorists. Since terror attacks create a widespread 
notion of insecurity, the government is likely to invest more heavily in security 
policies. As a consequence, individual freedoms will be restricted and taxes or 
budget deficits will rise. Accordingly, the support for the government may 
decline even if the country’s population does not back the terrorists. Moreover, 
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a harsh security response by the government aggravates grievances among the 
terror group’s actual and potential supporters, which drives out more moderate 
voices and helps recruiting terror agents (Crenshaw 1981; Rosendorff and 
Sandler 2004). The terror entrepreneurs need to balance these strategic benefits 
from terrorism against the costs imposed on them by the governmental 
crackdown on terrorism.3 
2.2  Foreign Alliances and Power Asymmetry 
Since terror entrepreneurs seek to gain political influence and control in their 
own countries, their targeting of foreign nationals is not self-explanatory. Terror 
entrepreneurs from the home country are typically not interested in gaining po-
litical power and control in the allied country. In other words, attacking the ally 
is not the ultimate goal of the terrorists. However, attacking the ally can offer 
important advantages in achieving the terrorists’ intermediate strategic goals. 
Some governments only survive with the support of their foreign allies. In 
other words, it is sometimes not the military strength of the home government 
itself that provides the largest obstacle for the terrorists’ bid for political power 
and control, but the military strength of the ally. The ally may, for example, 
station troops in the home country, it can provide military aid, arms, military 
training, political and economic support, and so on. The larger the power 
asymmetry between the foreign ally and the home country, the more dependent 
                                     
3  See Rosendorff and Sandler (2004), Bueno de Mesquita (2007), Bueno de 
Mesquita and Dickson (2007) and Powell (2007) for a formal modeling of 
governmental counter-terrorism. 
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the home government is on the military power of the ally and the more 
important therefore the ally becomes as an obstacle to the terrorists. The power 
asymmetry is starkest when the home government can only survive with the 
help of foreign troops stationed in the country (Pape 2005). In targeting the 
foreign ally, the terrorists hope to cause the ally’s withdrawal and retreat from 
interfering in the affairs of the home country, thus weakening the government 
and increasing the terrorists’ chances of success. 
Allies can also become an attractive target of the terror group because for 
various reasons attacks on nationals of the ally may be more popular among the 
terrorists’ peers and potential supporters. First, the presence of foreigners from 
the ally may be perceived as illegitimate: Foreign troops are seen as occupiers 
rather than allies, foreign businessmen as exploiters rather than as employers or 
business partners and foreign tourists as the thieves of cultural heritage rather 
than as a business opportunity. Again, this effect is likely to be strengthened by 
a large power asymmetry between the ally and the home country, as this creates 
widespread feelings of inferiority and humiliation among the native people. 
Along similar lines, nationals of the ally are often a more attractive 
target because media attention increases when foreigners die in the attack. As 
we have already argued, media attention enables the terrorists to spread their 
propaganda more easily. More powerful countries will have more media corpora-
tions and will enjoy greater global media coverage, such that a larger power 
asymmetry between the ally and the home country again makes targeting the 
foreign ally more attractive to the terrorists. 
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2.3  The Conditioning Effect of Regime Type 
Some scholars of terrorism have argued that democracies are more prone to 
suffer from terrorist attacks than autocratic regimes. Li (2005) and Enders and 
Sandler (2006), for example, state that civil rights and liberal homeland security 
policies make democracies more vulnerable and reduce the costs for terrorists. 
Democratic regimes should also be more responsive to the terrorists’ demands, if 
only indirectly by being more responsive to the demands of a public terrified by 
the terrorist attacks, thus raising the expected benefits of terrorism (Kydd and 
Walter 2006: 62 and 80). The insecurity and fear generated by terror campaigns 
puts public pressure on democratically elected governments to either defeat the 
terrorists or, as this is often impossible, to provide some concessions to their 
political demands. Suicide terrorism is particularly capable of inflicting harm 
and death on virtually any target, civilian or not, and it is not surprising that, 
as Pape (2003: 344) notes, ‘every suicide terrorist campaign since 1980 has been 
targeted against a state that had a democratic form of government’. About half 
of these campaigns resulted in major political concessions by the targeted 
democracies (Pape 2005). Finally, the greater press freedom in democracies 
ensures that the terrorists have a higher chance to propagate their ideology, 
when the attack is directed against targets in or from democratic countries. 
Yet, a systemic perspective makes one important contribution to the ana-
lysis of democracy and terrorism: Terrorist attacks on nationals from Norway 
and Sweden are extremely rare, while attacks on American or British nationals 
are much more frequent despite all these countries sharing similar degrees of 
liberal democracy and press freedom. This empirical observation suggests that 
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civic freedoms do not ‘cause’ terrorism per se. Terror entrepreneurs are not just 
interested in targeting innocent citizens from democracies, but in the strategic 
value of targets. Citizens from some democracies offer far greater strategic 
benefits than citizens from other democracies. Analyzing democracy from this 
perspective renders the argument straightforward: a higher degree of democracy 
in the ally raises the likelihood of terrorists targeting citizens from the ally for 
any given level of power asymmetry between the government and the ally. It 
lowers the opportunity costs and increases the expected payoff to terror entre-
preneurs of inflicting terror on nationals of the ally. This is because the more 
democratic the political regime in the ally country, the more pressure the ally 
government will experience from its public to withdraw support to the 
government from the terrorists’ home country in order to escape further terror 
attacks. Gartzke and Gleditsch (2004) argue that democracies are less reliable 
allies than autocracies due to fickle public opinion and transient coalitions. 
Exactly for this reason, terror entrepreneurs can expect to gain more from tar-
geting a democratic foreign ally than an autocratic one.  
Along similar lines, regime type in the terrorists’ home country will 
condition strategic reasons of terrorism as well. It can be argued that democracy 
can also have a pacifying effect as it raises the opportunity costs to terrorists by 
offering alternative, non-violent, means of conflict resolution (Schmid 1992; Li 
2005), thus reducing terrorism. In democracies, individuals can form interest 
groups and parties to promote their political preferences and actively participate 
in political competition. Democracies are also likely to inflict fewer grievances 
on the terrorists’ potential supporters exactly because they respect more civil 
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liberties and political rights, thus rendering it more difficult for terror 
entrepreneurs to recruit terror agents (Crenshaw 1981). 
Yet, again, once we consider the systemic perspective toward 
international terrorism, the link between democracy in the home country and 
terrorism on targets from the foreign ally becomes straightforward. A higher 
level of democracy in the terrorists’ home country may or may not discourage 
all forms of terrorism in this country. However, once we control for the direct 
impact of democracy in the home country, its conditioning effect on the joint 
effect of alliance and power asymmetry on terrorism against the foreign ally is 
unambiguously negative. Ceteris paribus, the more democratic the home 
country, the less it pays the terrorists to target nationals of the foreign ally 
rather than nationals of the home country. In targeting their own nationals, the 
terror leaders hope that the domestic public will put pressure on the home gov-
ernment to accommodate some of the terrorists’ demands and since democracies 
are more responsive to public demand, terror entrepreneurs expect a higher 
benefit from targeting nationals from the democratic home country rather than 
nationals from the ally. This holds true as long as one is willing to assume that 
the domestic public is less tolerant of harm inflicted on its own nationals than it 
is of harm inflicted on nationals from the foreign ally, which we think is highly 
plausible. 
2.4  Hypotheses 
While the micro-level of our theory has terror entrepreneurs and their agents as 
actors, it does not make predictions at the terror group level but rather at the 
dyadic country level: Terrorism against foreigners of a specific nationality 
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increase if the terror groups’ country of origin has an alliance with a more 
powerful and more democratic foreign power. Accordingly, we derive from our 
theory hypotheses for the dyadic country macro-level and we will estimate our 
empirical model at this level. In sum, our theory allows us to derive two testable 
hypotheses: First, an alliance between a foreign country and the home country 
increases terrorism against nationals of the foreign ally the more the larger the 
military capability of the foreign ally relative to the capability of the terrorists’ 
home country. Second, the joint effect of alliance and military power asymmetry 
on terrorism against nationals of the foreign ally is stronger the more 
democratic the political regime in the ally and is weaker the more democratic 
the political regime in the home country.  
3. Research Design 
Most empirical studies of terrorism use a non-dyadic research design and 
aggregate either all terror acts perpetrated on a country’s territory or all terror 
acts perpetrated by or suffered by a country’s nationals. To test our hypotheses 
we need a directed country dyad design instead. 
3.1. Data and Operationalization 
Terrorism is notoriously difficult to measure because clear-cut definitions that 
allow distinguishing terrorism from guerrilla warfare on the one hand (Sambanis 
2008) and terrorism from ordinary crime on the other hand do not exist. We 
rely upon the most widely used dataset of international terrorism – the 
“International Terrorism: Attributes of Terrorist Events” (Iterate) data 
(Mickolus et al. 2003). According to Iterate, terrorism is “the use, or threat of 
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use, of anxiety-inducing, extra-normal violence for political purposes by any 
individual or group, whether acting for or in opposition to established 
governmental authority, when such action is intended to influence the attitudes 
and behavior of a target group wider than the immediate victims” (ibid.: 2). 
Accordingly, ordinary crime as well as violence for purposes other than political 
are explicitly excluded. Violence committed during international and civil wars 
is not coded as terrorism either. Thus, guerrilla attacks by rebel groups are not 
counted, unless they are targeted against civilians or the dependents of military 
personnel (Mickolus, Sandler and Murdock 1989: xii).  
Importantly, the data set also excludes all terrorist acts, which are purely 
domestic. To qualify as international, a terrorist act must “through the 
nationality or foreign ties of its perpetrators, its location, the nature of its 
institutional or human victims, or the mechanics of its resolution, its 
ramifications transcend national boundaries” (Mickolus et al. 2003: 2). For our 
research, the limited comprehensiveness of the Iterate data set is unproblematic: 
our theory predicts an absolute increase in terrorist attacks on citizens from 
more powerful allied countries. True, it may well be that an increase in 
international terrorism reduces domestic terrorism (especially if extremist 
groups face binding resource constraints), but it may also be the case that 
changes in domestic terrorist activities are uncorrelated or even positively 
correlated with changes in international terrorist activities. Whichever is the 
case, this issue is of negligible importance here as our theory predicts an 
absolute increase in international terrorist activities as the relative military 
capability of the foreign ally increases.  
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Beyond this limit, Iterate provides a wealth of information on each terror 
incident. We use two pieces of information that allow us to create a directed 
country dyadic dependent variable: first, the nationality of the terrorists (the 
first nationality of terrorists in case more than one nationality is involved); and 
second, the nationality of the victims (again, the first nationality of victims in 
case nationals from several countries become victimized). We employ the annual 
sum of all terrorist incidents as our dependent variable, but our results are 
robust to counting only fatal incidents, i.e. incidents that led to the killing of 
one or more victims, as an alternative measure instead. The location of the 
terror incident as such does not matter. Thus, terrorists from country i might 
inflict terror on nationals from country j either in their home country i, or in 
country j or in some third country k. In all cases, terrorism is counted toward 
the directed dyad between i and j. 
To avoid multiple counting, only the first nationality of the terrorists and 
the victims determines the origin and the target country of a terrorist act in the 
results reported below. This has the disadvantage that information on the 
second and third primary nationality of terrorists and victims, also coded in 
Iterate, is lost, but the vast majority of terrorist acts only involve one 
nationality of both terrorists and victims. Our results are robust to attributing 
terrorist acts to all the first three main nationalities of terrorists and victims 
simultaneously. 
We have to deal with the additional complication that there are incidents 
in the Iterate dataset where the main nationality of the terrorists and the 
victims are the same. These cases do not necessarily constitute purely domestic 
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terrorism since some aspect of the incident other than the foreign nationality of 
the terrorists or victims, such as the incident’s resolution for example, 
transcends national boundaries to qualify for its inclusion in the dataset. Ho-
wever, these are cases in which the distinction between international and do-
mestic terrorism is often blurred. In other words, the Iterate data are noisy and 
there is inevitably some measurement error in what counts as international and 
domestic terrorism. Rather than eliminating these cases, we control for the 
measurement error they introduce by including a dummy variable for identical 
dyads (i.e., where the main nationality of the terrorists and the victims are the 
same). Our results remain robust if we do not include this dummy variable. The 
same is true for excluding the identical dyads from the sample. While these ob-
servations are therefore potentially problematic in principle, they do not affect 
our estimates much in practice. 
Clearly, our operationalization decisions may introduce some measure-
ment error into the data. For example, terror attacks do not always hit the 
intended victims. If, coincidentally, individuals of nations other than the 
targeted one become the major victims this means that our dependent variable 
is measured with error. Similarly, if transnational terror networks such as al-
Qaeda draw from an international pool of terror agents (e.g., employing 
Yemenite agents in attacks on Americans in Saudi Arabia), then this similarly 
leads to measurement error. Since, however, it is difficult to see why this 
measurement error should be systematically correlated with the explanatory 
variables, we do not expect bias from the way we compute the dependent 
variable. The same holds true for the information that we lose. For example, we 
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do not consider the very few cases, for which Iterate does not provide 
information on the primary nationality of terrorists or victims. Again, there is 
no reason to assume that Iterate systematically under- or over-reports the 
nationality of terrorists when the victims are citizens of an allied country. We 
also decided to exclude terror acts involving Israeli terrorists or Israeli victims. 
This is because the Arab-Israel conflict is unique. However, our results are 
robust to including these terror acts in the estimations. 
3.2. Explanatory Variables 
Our main explanatory variables are alliance, military power and regime type. 
We use two data sources for coding alliances. One is the Correlates of War 
(COW) Formal Interstate Alliance Data Set (Gibler and Sarkees 2004). This is 
perhaps better known than the second source, the Alliance Treaty Obligations 
and Provisions (ATOP) project (Leeds 2005; Sprecher and Krause 2006). 
However, whereas COW provides data only up to 2000, ATOP alliance data are 
available to 2003. We measure alliance with a dummy variable that indicates 
whether two countries had entered into a formal alliance in the form of a 
defence pact with each other.4 During the overlapping period, the two dummy 
                                     
4  ATOP differentiates in more detail among alliance types. For example, contrary 
to COW it also codes offense pacts. However, all alliances that include offense 
pacts also include defense pacts, so this makes no difference to our coding. Our 
results are robust toward additionally including non-aggression pacts (COW) or 
neutrality and non-aggression pacts (ATOP) as a weaker form of alliance between 
countries. So-called ententes (COW) or consultation pacts (ATOP) pledge 
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variables derived from each of our sources are very highly correlated with each 
other at r = .93. About 6.2 (COW) to 6.7 (ATOP) percent of dyad years in our 
sample are between allied countries. 
In accordance with the conflict literature we measure military power by 
the widely used Composite Index of National Capacity (CINC) score, also taken 
from the Correlates of War project and pioneered by Singer, Bremer and Stukey 
(1972). A country’s CINC score is a composite measure of its total population, 
urban population, iron and steel production, energy consumption, military 
personnel, and military expenditure. To measure the power differential between 
two countries, we divide the CINC score of the foreign country by the sum of 
CINC scores of the home and the foreign country. A higher value of this 
variable signifies increasing relative power of the foreign country relative to the 
home country and a value above 0.5 means that the foreign country is the more 
powerful of the two. Democracy is measured by the Polity project’s polity2 
variable (Marshall, Jaggers and Gurr 2006), which runs from –10 to 10. 
As additional variables, we include the log of per capita income, the level 
of democracy and the logged population size of both the terrorists’ origin 
country and the victims’ country. This follows arguments provided by Krueger 
and Laitin (2008) and Abadie (2006) on welfare and terrorism as well as the 
literature on democracy and terrorism discussed above. We also control for the 
population size of both countries to account for the simple fact that ceteris 
paribus more populous countries will generate more terrorism and suffer more 
                                                                                                            
nothing more than consultation and/or cooperation in crisis and are therefore 
excluded from the definition of alliance used here. 
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from terrorism. Data on income and population are taken from World Bank 
(2005). Lastly, we account for the fact that contiguity of two countries as well 
as geographical proximity lowers the costs for terrorists to execute terror acts 
against foreign nationals on the territory of the foreign country. The natural log 
of the distance between the capital cities of two countries and a dummy 
variable for contiguity by land or separation by sea of less than 150 miles are 
taken from Bennett and Stam (2005).5 In a further robustness test, we included 
a variable measuring the number of nationals from the target country living in 
the terrorist country to capture the pool of available potential victims within 
easy reach, with data taken from Parsons et al. (2007). This variable is not well 
suited for panel as opposed to cross-sectional data. However, if included in the 
estimations it has the expected positive sign, leaving our main results 
unaffected. 
3.3. Estimation Method and Models 
Our dependent variable is a count variable (number of terrorist incidents). The 
negative binomial is more reliable than the Poisson model, because our sample 
variance of the number of incidents exceeds its sample mean by factor 32. We 
therefore estimate negative binomial models with standard errors adjusted for 
clustering on country dyads, though the variation in incidents over time is large 
                                     
5  For lack of data, we cannot control for the amount and quality (Bueno de 
Mesquita 2007) of governmental counter-terrorist measures. However, insofar as 
these measures are correlated with per capita income, we control for them 
indirectly. 
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and clustering is of minor importance. We do not include year-specific time 
dummies, but our results are fully robust toward their inclusion. Our sample 
covers the period 1968 to 2003 and up to 150 countries. Due to missing data on 
the explanatory variables not all possible country dyads are included over the 
entire period. Approximately 0.5 percent of the dyads in our sample show 
terrorist activity. In robustness tests, we also estimate a so-called hurdle 
regression model to account for the dominance of values of zero in the sample. 
4. Results 
In this section, we test our hypotheses. Before we present results from the re-
gression analysis, we discuss two country cases and report some descriptive 
summary statistics to illustrate our theory.6 
4.1  Illustrative evidence 
The Philippines is a fairly dangerous country for foreigners. During the period 
1968 to 2000, Philippine terrorists committed 173 terror incidents involving 
foreigners. This puts the country into the top decile of countries from which 
international terrorism emanates. Of these acts of terrorism, 111 involved 
nationals of the US, which is allied to the Philippines. This represents a large 
share, even if taking into account that US citizens are major victims of 
international terrorism globally. While the Philippines may illustrate how being 
allied to a foreign country can expose nationals of the foreign ally to an 
                                     
6  These refer to using the COW data for alliances, but are very similar if ATOP 
data are used instead. 
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enhanced risk of terrorism, it is also a somewhat unusual case because the US is 
its only foreign ally. If we want to get a sense of how power differentials 
between allies affect international terrorism, then clearly we need to look for a 
different case. 
Colombia is a good candidate for illustrating our argument that there is 
not only an effect of international alliances on terrorism, but also that this effect 
is conditional on power differentials between the terrorists’ home country and 
the country of the victims. Colombia has both allies that are more powerful and 
allies that are less powerful than herself. Colombian terrorists have been respon-
sible for a large number of terrorist incidents (371) involving foreigners. 293 of 
these acts of terror involved nationals from allied countries (a share of 79 per-
cent). Of the 85 country dyad years, in which Colombian terrorists targeted 
nationals from foreign allies, only 34 involved nationals from countries with a 
lower military capability than Colombia’s. This is quite striking because in 
about 81 percent of country dyad years, Colombia is actually the more powerful 
country of the two allies. The United States alone, being just one out of many 
allies, but by far its militarily most capable one, accounts for 26 of the 85 
country dyad years. 
Our argument that the interaction effect between foreign alliance and 
power differentials is itself contingent on the level of democracy in both 
countries is, due to its complexity, rather difficult to illustrate with a case 
example. However, Colombia can again serve to shed some light on our 
argument. Colombia has been a democracy throughout the period of study, but 
its allies have not always been. The military power differential between 
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Colombia and its allies remains fairly stable over time, whereas the level of 
democracy shows modest change as some of its allies have experienced phases of 
autocratic regime. Out of the 713 country dyad years Colombia shares with 
foreign allies and for which we have data on the ally’s level of democracy, 302 
are with foreign autocracies.7 Interestingly, then, only 17 out of 293 terrorist 
incidents involved an autocratic foreign ally. 
Going beyond two specific case countries, next we briefly report some 
summary descriptive statistics that can further illustrate our argument. As 
mentioned already, about 6.2 percent of dyad years in our sample are made up 
of allied countries. Yet, 35.5 percent of incidents are associated with these dyad 
years of allied countries. Of those terror attacks targeted at nationals from fo-
reign allies, 85.8 percent of incidents involve nationals from foreign allies that 
are more powerful than the home country of the terrorists. Of these, 72 percent 
of incidents involve nationals from more powerful foreign allies that are also 
more democratic than the home country of the terrorists. Figure 1 displays this 
information graphically. It demonstrates how acts of international terrorism are 
concentrated on nationals from militarily more powerful allies and, particularly 
so, if these are more democratic than the terrorists’ home country.  
 
                                     
7  We chose 6 as the cut-off point, such that a polity value of 5 represents the most 
democratic autocracies and a value of 6 the least democratic democracies. 
21 
3092 incidents
     64.8%
  1682 incidents
       35.2%
4774 incidents
1039 incidents
      72.0%
239 incidents
     14.2%
 404 incidents
      28.0%
1443 incidents
      85.8%
allied
[6.2 %]
not allied
  [93.8 %]
ally more powerful
[50 %]
 ally less powerful
                  [50 %]
ally more democratic
[39.2 %]
ally less democratic
                  [60.8 %]
 
 
Figure 1: Terrorist incidents and international alliances, power differentials, and 
regime types 
 
Both figure 1 and the two country cases support our theory. However, neither of 
them controls for alternative explanations for international terrorism. Results, 
thus, may easily be spurious. 
4.2  Multivariate regression analysis 
As we have argued above, the effect of alliances on terrorism against the foreign 
ally’s nationals is contingent on the relative military capabilities of the foreign 
ally compared to the home country, and on the level of democracy in both 
countries. We approach these double contingencies by estimating two model 
types: In models 1 and 3 we are solely interested in the joint effect of alliance 
membership and power asymmetries. Models 2 and 4 interact this joint effect of 
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alliances and power asymmetries further with the level of democracy in both 
countries. The specification of these two models mirrors those used in Franzese 
(1999, 2003). In short, we first estimate the joint effect of alliances and power 
asymmetry. We then compute the vector of this joint effect and interact it with 
democracy in both the ally and the terrorists’ home country.8 Models 1 and 2 on 
the one hand and models 3 and 4 on the other differ only with respect to the 
operationalization of alliances. Models 1 and 2 use the COW data, models 3 and 
4 the ATOP data. Table 1 reports regression results. 
 
                                     
8  In Plümper and Neumayer (2008), we formally derive this model specification. 
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Table 1: Negative binomial estimates of international terrorist incidents. 
 model 1 model 2 model 3 model 4 
Operationalization of 
Alliance Variable 
COW ATOP 
ln population of  
terrorists’ home country 
0.5069 
(0.0579) *** 
0.5064 
(0.0280) *** 
0.5053 
(0.0571) *** 
0.5010 
(0.0273) *** 
ln population of  
targeted country 
0.6404 
(0.0543) *** 
0.6355 
(0.0381) *** 
0.6443 
(0.0545) *** 
0.6386 
(0.0358) *** 
ln gdppc of  
terrorists’ home country 
0.0089 
(0.0413) 
-0.0029 
(0.0343) 
0.0098 
(0.0398) 
0.0015 
(0.0341) 
ln gdppc of  
targeted country 
0.6884 
(0.0460) *** 
0.6948 
(0.0409) *** 
0.6924 
(0.0449) *** 
0.6985 
(0.0392) *** 
democracy in terrorists’ 
home country  
-0.0127 
(0.0069) * 
0.0023 
(0.0088) 
-0.0222 
(0.0070) *** 
-0.0118 
(0.0086) * 
democracy in target  
country  
0.0097 
(0.0088)  
-0.0026 
(0.0109) 
0.0063 
(0.0087)  
-0.0050 
(0.0103) 
contiguity 
 
0.3206 
(0.3223)  
0.3140 
(0.3181)  
0.4690 
(0.3064)  
0.4545 
(0.3028)  
identical dyad 
 
2.8470 
(0.4289) *** 
2.7795 
(0.4132) *** 
3.0752 
(0.4251) *** 
2.9807 
(0.4080) *** 
ln distance 
 
-0.2761 
(0.0477) *** 
-0.2815 
(0.0462) *** 
-0.2474 
(0.0468) *** 
-0.2549 
(0.0453) *** 
joint membership in alliance 0.6660 
(0.3303) * 
 0.6612 
(0.3342) * 
 
relative military strength  
of target country 
0.3127 
(0.4273)  
 0.2512 
(0.4291)  
 
alliance * relative  
military strength of ally 
1.1209 
(0.4177) ** 
 1.2096 
(0.4089) ** 
 
vector from grey-shaded 
variables of model 1 
 0.8936 
(0.1170) *** 
 0.8688 
(0.1132) *** 
vector * democracy 
(terrorists) 
 -0.0352 
(0.0092) *** 
 -0.0266 
(0.0087) ** 
vector * democracy (target)  0.0351 
(0.0138) * 
 0.0331 
(0.0131) * 
intercept -28.5704 
(1.0587) *** 
-28.3355 
(1.0270) *** 
-28.9598 
(0.9879) *** 
-28.6752 
(0.9537) *** 
ln alpha 2.8352 
(0.1205) *** 
2.8103 
(0.1212) *** 
2.8723 
(0.1196) *** 
2.8509 
(0.1196) *** 
N obs.  484,729 484,729 547,828 547,828 
Wald chi² 1960.05 *** 1978.13 *** 2081.09 *** 2094.00 *** 
-ll 12995.55 12976.25 13690.49 13675.31 
Pseudo-R² 0.256 0.257 0.256 0.257 
  
 
Standard errors clustered on country dyads in parentheses, * p(z)<0.1  ** p(z)<0.01  *** p(z)<0.001 
 
Before we come to our variables of main interest and thus to our hypotheses, let 
us briefly discuss results on the control variables. As expected, both size and 
geography matter for terrorism in dyads of countries. The population size of the 
target country has a slightly larger effect on terrorist activity than the popula-
tion size of the terrorists’ home country. Distance also matters. The number of 
terrorist incidents declines in geographical distance between the origin and the 
potential target country. Neighborhood effects as measured by contiguity, which 
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tend to have a strong impact on militarized conflict between countries, are in-
significant, however, once we control for distance. 
The effect of per capita income in origin countries on terrorism remains 
controversial in the literature (see Krueger and Malecková 2003 for an insightful 
review). Our results lend some support to those who do not believe that 
terrorism originates in poverty (Piazza 2006). One has to keep in mind, 
however, that our results report the effect of a country’s average income on 
international terrorist activity. Any inferences back to the motivation of 
individual terrorists necessarily suffer from environmental fallacy. 
Our findings provide little support for an unconditional effect of 
democracy in the target country on terrorist activities. This can be seen from 
the statistically insignificant coefficients for this variable in models 1 and 3, in 
which democracy is not interacted with another variable. As concerns de-
mocracy in the terrorists’ home country, the unconditional effect on incidents is 
significant in models 1 and 3, suggesting that more democratic countries 
produce fewer international terrorist attacks. 
Turning to our variables of main interest, the correct interpretation of 
the results reported in table 1 is rendered very difficult by the non-linearity of 
the negative binomial regression model. In a linear model, the hypothesis that 
the effect of one independent variable on the dependent variable depends on 
another explanatory variable can be easily tested by a t-test of the estimated 
coefficient of the interaction term (Kam and Franzese 2007: 50). If this were a 
linear model, then results from models 1 and 3 on the coefficient of the 
interaction between alliance and relative military strength of the ally would 
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indeed suggest that joint membership in an alliance exerts a statistically 
significantly stronger effect on the number of terrorist incidents the higher the 
relative power differentials between the two countries, in accordance with our 
first hypothesis. Similarly, the results for the interacted variables from models 2 
and 4 would suggest that the combined effect of alliance and power differentials 
becomes significantly weaker the more democratic the terrorists’ home country 
and significantly stronger the more democratic the target country, in line with 
our second hypothesis. 
Unfortunately, this easy way of testing the statistical significance of an 
interaction effect no longer applies when the model is non-linear. As Ai and 
Norton (2003: 129) have shown, in nonlinear models “the interaction effect (…) 
cannot be evaluated simply by looking at the sign, magnitude, or statistical 
significance of the coefficient of the interaction term.” Instead, the 
interpretation of the interaction term requires computing the cross derivative of 
the expected value of the dependent variable, which depends on all the 
covariates in the model and their values. Testing the significance of interaction 
terms in non-linear models is thus an extremely complex task and in Plümper 
and Neumayer (2008), the working paper version of this article, we explain in 
detail how we have dealt with this problem. In brief, we find broad support for 
the existence of a significant interaction effect unless the values of the control 
variables render terrorism extremely unlikely. 
4.3.  Effect strengths 
We now turn to evaluating the substantive effect of our main variables of 
interest. Table 2 reports the predicted joint effects of alliance membership and 
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power differential for a range of values of relative military strength of the target 
country, based on estimation results from model 1.9 The reported values are 
percentage changes in the predicted count of terrorist incidents relative to a 
chosen reference category in which both countries are equally powerful and 
share no alliance with each other (controls are kept at their sample means). The 
presence of an alliance increases the predicted count strongly and the more so 
the larger the power differential.  
 
Table 2. Predicted Joint Effect of Power Difference and Alliance. 
 
  non allied dyad  allied dyad 
 0.1 -11.4  92.4 
relative military 0.3 -6.3  157.0 
strength of  0.5 0.0  241.8 
target country 0.7 6.3  355.7 
 0.9 13.9  507.6 
 
Note: Percentage change in predicted count of terrorist 
incidents relative to base category (no alliance, relative military 
strength 0.5, all control variables at mean values). Estimates 
based on model 1.  
 
Being based on model 1, these predicted joint effects do not yet take into ac-
count the conditioning effect of democracy in the terrorists’ home country and 
the target country. Table 3 therefore shows the predicted joint effect of alliance 
membership, power differential and democracy for a range of relevant values, 
based on estimation results from model 2.10 Similar to table 4, we report these 
                                     
9  Effects are substantively identical for model 3. 
10  Effects are substantively identical for model 4. 
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effects as a percentage change relative to a chosen base category in which, as 
before, the two countries are not allied and are equally powerful and, in 
addition now, they are also equally democratic. All other variables are held at 
their sample mean.  
Looking at the predicted joint effects for dyads that are not allied with 
each other, it becomes apparent that even a very large military power 
differential value of 0.9 together with the largest possible difference in demo-
cracy score between the target and the terrorists’ home country (20) increases 
the expected count of terrorist attacks by only 29.6 percent relative to our base 
category. This contrasts starkly with the predicted joint effects for when the 
two dyads are allied with each other. If the two countries are equally powerful 
and equally democratic, the existence of an alliance raises the expected count 
almost twofold relative to the base category in which both countries are also 
equally powerful and democratic, but not allied with each other. Our estimates 
suggest that the effect of alliances ceteris paribus becomes much more 
pronounced if the foreign ally is more powerful than the terrorists’ home 
country. The same occurs if the ally’s level of democracy drastically exceeds the 
democracy level of the terrorists’ home country. On the other hand, if the 
terrorists’ home country is very democratic whereas the foreign ally is very 
autocratic, then the effect of alliance on terror against citizens of the foreign ally 
becomes small, even for large power differentials. We therefore conclude here 
that not only do alliances, power asymmetries and the level of democracy in 
both of the allied countries exert a statistically significant, but also a 
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substantively large influence on the change in the expected number of terrorist 
attacks. 
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Table 3. Predicted Joint Effect of Democracy, Power Difference and Alliance. 
 
  non-allied dyads  allied dyads 
  democracy difference between target 
country and terrorists’ country 
 democracy difference between target 
country and terrorists’ country 
  -20 -10 0 10 20  -20 -10 0 10 20 
relative military 0.1 -8.6 -9.3 -10.7 -11.6 -13.6  6.2 38.3 79.3 132.7 201.2 
strength of  0.5 -6.2 -3.1 0.0 3.1 6.2  18.5 88.3 199.2 374.1 653.1 
target country 0.9 -3.7 3.7 11.9 20.4 29.6  32.1 157.4 399.6 866.7 1781.5 
 
Note: Percentage change in predicted count of terrorist incidents relative to base category (no alliance, 
relative military strength 0.5 and no difference in democracy between target and terrorists’ home, all control 
variables at mean values). Estimates based on model 2.  
30 
4.4  Robustness tests 
Our results are robust toward various modifications to the design of our 
empirical analysis. We have mentioned already that, for example, they are 
robust toward counting more than one nationality of terrorists and victims 
simultaneously, toward several ways of dealing with observations in which the 
terrorists and their victims share the same nationality and toward the exclusion 
or inclusion of Israel in the estimations.  
In addition, we analyzed the effects of excluding the somewhat special 
case of anti-American terrorism from the sample. Americans are major victims 
of international terrorism (see Author 2007b). The US is also the militarily 
strongest country in the world, with many international alliances and the 
highest possible level of democracy on the Polity scale. Hence, one might be 
concerned whether our results are driven by terror victims from a single 
country. We therefore re-ran models 2 and 4 on a sample that excludes the US 
as a target of terror to explore whether our estimation results hinge on this one 
special case. We find it does not. 
We conducted another robustness test to address the fact that 
international terrorism is a relatively rare event and some dyad years are much 
more likely to experience any such terrorism than others. To account for the 
fact that our dependent variable has a large number of zeros, we also estimated 
all models with what is known as a hurdle model. The hurdle model combines a 
binary model to predict values of zero with another model to predict non-zero 
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values.11 Its underlying assumption is that different mechanisms account for 
zeros than for the distribution of non-zeros. We doubt whether this estimation 
procedure is consistent with the processes that generate international terrorism, 
but we prefer hurdle models to the zero-inflated negative binomial alternative 
since this latter model rests on even less tenable assumptions. It assumes that 
some dyad years do not experience international terrorism with probability of 
one (Long and Freese 2006: ch. 8) – which seems to be inconsistent with 
empirical evidence and for which there is no obvious theoretical justification 
either. In re-estimating models 2 and 4 with the hurdle model we found that all 
the variables of interest to our theory affect the first binary part with 
coefficients that are identical in coefficient sign to the coefficients we get in the 
negative binomial estimations and are also statistically significant. With one 
exception, the same is true for the second part. 
5. Conclusion 
Like all international conflicts, patterns of terrorism are influenced by 
international relations between countries and their interaction with domestic 
political conditions. We have analyzed how the presence of an international 
alliance in combination with power differentials between the two countries 
                                     
11  For the first part, we used a logit estimator and a geometric estimator for the 
second part as the negative binomial estimator failed to converge for this part. 
The geometric regression is a special case of the negative binomial and well suited 
as a simpler alternative to the negative binomial when the count of the 
dependent variable diminishes in a smooth decreasing manner (Hilbe 2007: 138). 
The data we analyze satisfies this condition.  
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affects terror inflicted by terrorists of one of the allied countries on nationals of 
the other one and how this effect is dependent on regime type in both countries. 
The military ties between countries influence the strategic calculation of 
terrorists. Hitting targets from more powerful allies is especially beneficial for 
terrorists in the weaker of the allied countries. 
Our empirical estimations lend ample support to our theory. Military al-
liances expose nationals of the foreign ally to an increased risk of terrorism from 
the home country and the more so the more powerful the foreign ally is relative 
to the home country. A higher level of democracy in the political regime of the 
foreign ally increases the joint effect of foreign alliance and power differentials 
further, while, conversely, a higher level of democracy in the home country 
reduces the strength of the interaction effect as the terror entrepreneurs’ 
strategic interest shifts away from targeting citizens of the foreign ally and to-
ward the benefits of targeting nationals from the terrorists’ home country. 
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